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CASE COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS: LIMITATION ON FORUM STATE IN
BARRING FOREIGN STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951)
The Wisconsin administrator of a decedent killed in an automobile accident in Illinois sought to recover in the Wisconsin state
court from the individual defendant and his insurer for wrongful
death under an Illinois statute.' The administrator, the decedent,
and the individual defendant were citizens of Wisconsin, and the
insurer was incorporated in Wisconsin. On motion of the defendants
the trial court entered summary judgment dismissing the complaint
on the merits on the ground that a Wisconsin statute2 authorizing an
action for deaths caused in that state alone established a Wisconsin
policy against entertaining actions under the wrongful death acts of
other states. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, notwithstanding the contention that the local statute so construed violated the
full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. 4 On appeal, HELD, the Wisconsin policy of barring all actions for wrongful
death occurring elsewhere while allowing similar actions for death occasioned in Wisconsin is forbidden by the national policy of the full
faith and credit clause looking toward maximum enforcement in
each state of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the
statutes of sister states. Reversed and remanded, Justices Frankfurter, Reed, Jackson, and Minton dissenting.
That the United States Constitution requires each state to give
full faith and credit to a valid judgment of a sister state has long
been settled. This mandate comes into play even though the forum
is not required to entertain an action of the type giving rise to the
foreign judgment. Examples can be found in many fields, including
taxation, 5 wrongful death,6 gambling debts,7 and workmen's compenIILL. ANN. STAT. C. 70, §§1, 2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1951).
2WIS. STAT. §331.03 (1951). The exact wording of the objectionable portion is:
. provided, that such action shall be brought for a death caused in this state."
3Hughes v. Fetter, 257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W.2d 452 (1950).
4U.S. CONST. Art. IV, §.
5Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
6Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411 (1920). At this time it was thought
that such a statute was not entitled to full faith and credit.
7Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1907), followed in Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S.
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sation.8 One major exception is that full faith and credit need not
be accorded the penal laws of another jurisdiction; 9 but courts have
differed widely as to what constitutes a penaltyO and the Supreme
Court has quite logically given the term a restricted meaning."
In 1868 a question arose as to whether New York had to give full
faith and credit to an attachment of iron safes in Illinois, the resultant judgment for debt, and the sale of the safes in satisfaction,
when all parties involved were citizens of New York; 12 and the Supreme Court compelled New York to accept the Illinois proceeding
as valid. While this decision may on its face seem to involve full faith
and credit with respect to judgments, it is properly classified as full
faith and credit to statutes, inasmuch as statutory attachment proceedings are involved. The Supreme Court has held that statutes of the
state of incorporation of fraternal benefit insurance societies must be
accorded full faith and credit, 13 although it has not extended this
doctrine to other types of insurance companies.-4 Similarly, full faith
551 (1947); Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928).
SMagnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
9Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888); cf. The Antelope, 10 Wheat.
66 (U.S. 1825); contrast Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) (penal liability
for company debts upheld though based on knowingly issuing false certificate as
director); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (penal
damages for negligently killing another allowed).
1ODale v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 57 Kan. 601, 47 Pac. 521 (1897); Derrickson
v. Smith, 27 NJ.L. (3 Dutch.) 166 (Sup. Ct. 1858); Mohr v. Sands, 44 Okla. 330,
133 Pac. 238 (1913); aff'd on rehearing, 144 Pac. 381 (1914); Bettys v. Milwaukee,
St. P. & P.R.R., 37 Wis. 323 (1875).
"Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673 (1892): "The question whether a
statute of one State, which in some aspects may be called penal, is a penal law in
the international sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another
state, depends upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offense
against the public justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to a person
injured by the wrongful act."
"2Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139 (U.S. 1868) (attachment on safes levied
in Illinois prior to notice or recordation of issuance of chattel mortgage thereon
in New York or delivery of safes to mortgagee; Illinois judgment pleaded in bar
to mortgagee's action in New York against judgment creditor for value of safes
sold).
"3Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (full
faith and credit required to be given to charter provisions of the Society putting
limitation of 6 months on bringing claim for death benefits); Modem Woodmen of
America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v.
Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
14Hoope ton Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1942); Pink v. A.A.A. High-
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and credit must be given to the laws of the state of incorporation in
instances of stockholders' liability assessments. 15
American courts have for some time been operating primarily on
the basis of the usual doctrine in conflict of laws that rights acquired
in a foreign jurisdiction are entitled to protection unless clearly contrary to both the law and public policy of the forum. Furthermore,
the interpretations of the full faith and credit clause in recent years
have tended to restrict the freedom of the states in issues involving
choice of law. The main question today is the extent of this restriction. In 1932 the Workmen's Compensation Act of Vermont, where
the relationship of employer and employee had been established in
the circumstances at bar, was held paramount to the conflicting statute of New Hampshire, where the injury occurred and the suit was
brought.16 A few years later the Supreme Court forced New Jersey
to give full faith and credit to the liability of New Jersey stockholders
of a New York banking corporation to assessment under a New York
statute despite contrary provisions of New Jersey law, the assessment
being held an incident of incorporation."
Now Hughes v. Fetter has extended this application of the full
faith and credit clause to wrongful death statutes. That a statute is
a public act within the meaning of the full faith and credit clause
is settled. 18 Although a state court may, under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in appropriate cases, refuse to entertain a cause of
action arising in a sister state,' 9 the Hughes case does not come within this doctrine;20 the appellant, the decedent and both defendants
way Express, 314 U.S. 201 (1941); cf. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
-Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243
(1912).
16Bradford Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). The Vermont statutory action was in lieu of a tort action and was not obnoxious to New
Hampshire law; it was expressly made an exclusive remedy and was expressly made
applicable to injuries sustained outside Vermont.
17Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
1SE.g., Bradford Elec. Light 8:Power Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932);
Modem Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924).
19E.g., Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933). Needless to say,
this doctrine does not mean that a court with a crowded docket can refuse to
hear cases merely because they are "not convenient" from the standpoint of the
court.
2oAt p. 612: "The Wisconsin policy, moreover, cannot be considered as an application of the forum non conveniens doctrine, whatever effect that doctrine
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were Wisconsin citizens, and proceedings there were definitely not
inappropriate. The Court also made clear its reluctance to be arbitrary and deliberately left room for the continued existence of competing public policies among the states; but the five majority justices
were impressed by the obvious fact that Wisconsin had no antipathy
to wrongful death actions as a matter of substantive law and state
policy.
The dissent, basing its argument primarily on the lack of any preexisting relationship between the parties, in contrast to the earlier
groups of cases, argued that, whereas fixed rules may be needed in
order to enable parties to predict the consequences of a transaction
at the time of entry into it, the same necessity for imposing a "state of
vassalage" on the forum in tort actions does not exist.21 The majority,
on the other hand, seemed mainly concerned with insuring to the injured party in every instance a forum for enforcing his acquired
substantive rights granted by the situs of the injury, provided the
forum has no contrary public policy as to these substantive
rights. Indeed, uniformity of this nature was the main purpose of
22
the full faith and credit dause.
Hughes v. Fetter was recently cited as controlling before a federal
court of appeals in a case involving the death by airplane crash in
Utah of an Illinois citizen.23 Utah had at the time a wrongful death
statute 2 4 and the Delaware corporate defendant had agents available
in Utah for service of process there. The Illinois act forbids actions
in Illinois to recover damages for death occasioned elsewhere provided a right of action exists there and the defendant can be served
there. 25 Considered in the light of these provisos, the Illinois statute
was upheld as a bar against an action instituted in a federal district
court in Illinois. The court of appeals distinguished Hughes v. Fetter
might be given if its use resulted in denying enforcement to public acts of other
states."
2ZAt p. 617.
22Pink v. AAA.

Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941): "It was the pur-

pose of that provision to preserve rights acquired or confirmed under the public
acts and judicial proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of their validity

in others."
23First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. United Airlines, Inc., 190 F.2d 493 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 903 (1951).
24UTAH REV. STAT. §104-3-11 (1933).
25ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 70, §2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1951): "Provided, further, that
no action shall be brought or prosecuted in this State to recover damages for
a death occurring outside of this State where a right of action for such death exists

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1952

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1952], Art. 5
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

on the ground that the Illinois wrongful death act does not exclude
all foreign wrongful death actions, as does the Wisconsin act, and that
the uniformity prescribed by the full faith and credit clause does not
compel a state to provide an additional forum when the state in
which the cause of action originated already offers one. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari,26 although any four of the five majority
justices of the Hughes case could have granted the request for review.
The denial is not inconsistent, however. The dissenters in the Hughes
case stressed the fact that the administrator could in these circumstances have brought an action effectively in Illinois. Justice Black, for
the majority, construed the statute at its worst, and pointed out that
under some circumstances it might leave a plaintiff with an unenforceable claim, thereby in effect destroying his right. This crusade against
sweeping draftsmanship is not new, particularly to Justices Black and
Douglas, 27 but the Illinois statute meets the objection to the Wisconsin statute on this score.
The instant case, in its narrowest sense, accordingly forbids a state
to refuse unqualifiedly to enforce all causes of action based on the
wrongful death acts of sister states. The fact that the decision was five
to four indicates that further expansion of the doctrine is not likely
at present. The instant case was definitely not a choice of law problem, since the accident and wrongful death both occurred in one state.
Rather, the problem was whether the forum could refuse to enforce
the applicable statutes of all sister states under all possible circumstances in an effort to reduce its litigation burdens.
The next step may be inclusion of the common law of sister states
within the "public acts" of the full faith and credit clause. If this
is done the clause will then have reached its maximum extension. It
is submitted that the instant decision, as limited by First National
Bank of Chicago v. United Airlines, Inc., 28 and as qualified in the

instant opinion from the standpoints of substantive policy of the
forum and of the forum non conveniens doctrine, is a practical step
forward without trampling upon the broad governmental areas reserved to the states by the Constitution.
MILO I. THOMAS, JR.
under the laws of the place where such death occurred and service of process in
such suit may be had upon the defendant in such place."
26341 U.S. 903 (1951).
27See, e.g., Saia v. People of New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), Note, 2 U. oF FLA.
L. REV. 103 (1949); cf. the able analysis by Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil
Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 553-554 (1951).
28

See note 23 supra.
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